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Clayton Littlejohn 
 
Abstract: Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. 
Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don’t necessarily think that this is a good thing. 
If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual 
justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or 
evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of 
either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn’t very much like 
the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with 
experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our 
perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and 
their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying 
our evidence with things that don’t figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good 
independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief-like to provide us with 
something premise-like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn’t let 
questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don’t think 
that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how 
perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that 
I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially 
grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don’t seem to be many direct 
arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In 
this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I’ve found for thinking that justification and 
knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don’t find them convincing. I 
think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that 
our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate 
Davidson’s (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for 
forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we 
understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.   
   
“Sometimes nothing can be a real cool hand”—Lucas Jackson. 
  
1. Introduction 
Maybe we don’t need perceptual evidence.1 When Davidson said, “nothing can count as a reason 
for holding a belief except another belief” (1986: 141), he didn’t miss the mark by much. Beliefs 
																																																						
1 For the purposes of this discussion, I shall assume that a thinker’s evidence consists of 
propositions or facts and that having this evidence requires having some propositional attitude. 
There are other conceptions of evidence (e.g., Conee and Feldman’s (2004) view that our 
experiences are evidence), but I explained in my (2012) why I think we should not identify 
evidence with experiences.  If having evidence (in the sense operative here) is necessary for 
having a justification to believe p, having a justification to believe p requires having some 
propositional attitude that’s distinct from the belief that p with a suitable content. In the case of 
perceptual justification, this would have to be an experience or a perception if there is perceptual 
evidence. (It will simplify the discussion to focus on such views, but see Conee and Feldman 
(2004) and McCain (2014) for defences of alternative conceptions of evidence. I explain why I 
don’t think experiences are evidence in Littlejohn (2012).)  I should flag something discussed in 
Littlejohn (2017). Even if science teaches us that experiences have certain properties (e.g., they 
are propositional attitudes in their own right), there might be creatures very similar to us that 
have bursts of perceptual consciousness, perceptual beliefs, and the ability to steer through their 
environments who lack perceptual evidence (as understood here) because there are no 
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(understood as acts, not objects) are never really a reason for holding another belief, but what we 
believe or know can be a reason to believe something. Close enough.2  
Sceptical? Here is a quick and dirty argument. Suppose that you’re in some state of mind, 
X. I won’t tell you what kind of state X is, but here are two possibilities about X. The first is that 
X differs from belief in terms of its representational properties or the commitment it entails. The 
second is that it doesn’t differ from beliefs in this way.  
Let’s consider the first possibility, which is that X lacks the representational properties of 
a belief (e.g., it doesn’t have a content that is accurate iff some proposition (e.g., that Agnes’s 
eyes are blue) is true) or X doesn’t commit you to something being true in the way that belief 
does (i.e., unlike belief, being in this state doesn’t mean that either Agnes’s eyes are blue or 
you’re mistaken about that). Obviously, if being in X doesn’t have belief-like content (e.g., that 
Agnes’s eyes are blue), its content couldn’t identify your reason for changing your mind about 
what colour Agnes’s eyes are.3 So, it couldn’t be the source of something that was your reason 
for believing that they weren’t green, grey, brown, etc. Suppose X has some kind of content, 
however, but it doesn’t commit you to the truth of that content in the way that belief does (i.e., 
whereas believing that Agnes’s eyes are blue means that either they are or you’re mistaken about 
that, being in X doesn’t mean that either her eyes are blue or that you’re mistaken about that). 
Then it couldn’t be by virtue of being in X that this content (i.e., that Agnes’s eyes are blue) 
could be your reason for f-ing. Why not? Being in X would be compatible with being agnostic 
about whether Agnes’s eyes were blue. And if you’re agnostic about whether p, it couldn’t be that 
p is, by your lights, why f-ing would be sensible, reasonable, right, required, virtuous, desirable, 
etc. Just as an agnostic’s reason for going to church cannot be that attendance pleases God 
greatly, being in a state that leaves you agnostic about Agnes’s eye colour cannot explain how it 
could be that your reason for believing that her parents passed on a recessive gene for eye colour 
is that her eyes are blue. Maybe X plays some role in a causal process that produces a belief with 
this content, but it’s only by virtue of being in this distinct belief state that this content, which 
you’d be committed to the truth of by virtue of believing and not by virtue of being in X, is 
available to function in your reasoning as one of your reasons. So, if experience differs from 
belief in one of these ways, experience on its own doesn’t put propositionally specified evidence 
or reasons into your possession.   
What if X doesn’t differ from belief in these ways? If being in X means that you’re in an 
attitude where you’re committed to the truth of p, p might be something that could be one of 
your reasons for f-ing, but then X would be a belief.45 So, Davidson was just about right. If p is 
																																																																																																																																																																								
propositional attitudes antecedent to the beliefs formed in response to experience. (See Feldman 
(2004) and Pryor (2000) for discussion.) Could these creatures could have perceptual knowledge 
or perceptual justification? I see no reason that they couldn’t, but such creatures would have 
justification and knowledge without supporting perceptual evidence.   
2 In saying that he was close enough, I’m not endorsing Davidson’s coherentism. If a subject’s 
evidence just is her knowledge, we could have a foundationalist view on which the foundations 
consist of immediate knowledge and all the rest of our knowledge is derived via inference from 
the foundations.   
3 See Byrne’s (2005) discussion of the idea that states without belief-like content might provide 
us with reasons for our beliefs.  
4 See Collins (1987) for a defence of this conception of belief. See Littlejohn (2017) for a defence 
of the view that it’s impossible for someone’s reason for f-ing to be p if they’re agnostic about 
whether p. See Hyman (2015) for a defence of the view that we need to know p for p to be one 
the reasons that might rationally guide us.  
5 Because of the commitment-condition, we can agree with Logue (2014), Siegel (2005), and 
Schellenberg (2018) that experience has content and still doubt that there’s such a thing as 
perceptual evidence.  Denying that there is perceptual evidence is not tantamount to denying 
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potentially among the things that could be your reason for f-ing, it’s something believed. Seeing 
and experiencing alone doesn’t make something believed. Davidson’s scepticism about whether 
non-doxastic states could provide us with evidence or reasons for belief was well placed given 
the standard glosses on the subject’s reason as something that figures in reasoning (typically by 
being an object of belief) and something that helps us see what it was that the agent thought 
made some response rationalised by reasoning one that was sensible, intelligible, appropriate, 
right, desirable, etc. Maybe Davidson should have said more than just that experiences can cause 
us to believe, but I think we have reasonably well worked out views now about how experiences 
can function as inputs to processes that produce beliefs that look for all the world to be good 
candidates for knowledge. And I don’t think it’s a fault of such accounts that they never say that 
our perceptual beliefs are based on propositionally specified evidence. Obviously, opinions differ 
on just this point. If this is right, we might still base our perceptual beliefs on perceptions and 
experiences, but we might not thereby base our beliefs on perceptual evidence.6   
Other epistemologists often insist that we do need perceptual evidence. They say we 
need it for perceptual justification and knowledge. I disagree. I think we need it for neither. We 
should consider their case, though. Some will say that it’s needed for justification (and, perhaps, 
needed for knowledge for that reason). Some will say that it’s needed for knowledge (and, 
perhaps, needed for justification for that reason). I’ve found three arguments in the literature for 
thinking that we couldn’t possible have justification or couldn’t have knowledge without 
supporting evidence. I shall review the ones I’ve found and explain why none of them settle the 
issue.7  
The first argument is designed to show that we need perceptual evidence for perceptual 
justification. I shall argue that this argument fails unless it can be shown that a certain kind of 
knowledge isn’t possible. The second argument is designed to show that this kind of knowledge 
isn’t possible, but it commits us to a view of knowledge that most readers would agree is 
impossible to defend. Our third argument is less direct than our first two. It seeks to show that 
we need to posit perceptual evidence to understand how perceptual justification and knowledge 
is defeasible. This argument is quite powerful, but its power derives from the explanatory power 
of a particular view of knowledge and of defeat that I shall criticise. I shall offer an alternative 
account of defeat that, I think, improves upon this one. My account frees us from any 
commitment to the idea of perceptual evidence. So, maybe we don’t need perceptual evidence. 
Sometimes nothing is enough.8 
																																																																																																																																																																								
that experience is conceptual. For a defence of a view on which belief and experience are 
sufficiently connected for experience to provide evidence for non-perceptual beliefs, see Glüer 
(2009). 
6 On Swain’s (1979: 27) view, a belief might have a causal basis that’s a state of mind or mental 
event and an evidential basis that’s a proposition and it seems that in cases where the causal basis 
of a belief isn’t a further propositional attitude, we could have causal basing without evidential 
basing and still meet the conditions imposed by his general theory of justification.  
7 Right or wrong, the English language seems to conspire against the view that Davidson denies. 
As Unger (1975) notes, we cannot say that Inge’s reason for believing that Agnes’s parents had 
blue eyes is that Agnes’s eyes are blue unless we’re prepared to say that Inge knows that Agnes’s 
eyes are blue. If it’s encoded into our language that sentences of the form, ‘Inge’s reason for f-
ing was that p’ entails, ‘Inge knows that p’, English rigs the game against the view that says that 
sometimes Inge’s reason for f-ing is something that she doesn’t know but merely perceives.   
8 By ‘nothing’, here I mean, ‘nothing in the body of evidence that provides the right kind of 
evidential support’. It seems that we can consistently say that nothing provides evidential support 
for a belief while allowing that something figures in some complex story about how knowledge is 
acquired. I don’t think that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman (2004) would want to deny 
that it is an interesting philosophical question as to whether such inputs have to be evidence 
 4 
 
2. Lord on the nature of defeat 
Lord’s (2013) argument fills a surprising gap in the literature.9 Given the popularity of the view 
that it’s impossible to have justification for any belief without supporting evidence for it, we 
would expect the literature to be filled with arguments that support this view.10 The literature 
isn’t always what we want it to be. His argument is supposed to show that all justification 
requires evidence. We disagree about this, but our disagreement doesn’t necessarily go all that 
deep. We can both agree with Raz when he says, “the normativity of all that is normative 
consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (1999: 67). Let’s use talk 
of ‘reasons’ and ‘reason’ to capture what we want to say about normative status. And let’s 
suppose that only pieces of evidence can be good reasons to believe.11 The issue that separates us 
is whether we always need good reasons to believe p to have justification to believe p.  
 Let’s consider Lord’s argument:  
(L1) If p is not supported by sufficient reasons, then the set 
of reasons to believe p is defeated.  
(L2) If the set of reasons to believe p is defeated, then p is not 
propositionally rational.  
(LC) Thus, if p is not supported by sufficient reasons, then p 
is not propositionally rational (2013: 87). 
As Lord anticipates, my issue is with (L1). 
 The argument is supposed to show that if p is not supported by sufficient reasons (not 
‘reason’), then it couldn’t be rational to believe p. While it might seem quite plausible that it is 
only rational to believe when there is sufficient reason (not ‘reasons’), I don’t see why we need 
one or more good reasons (again, not ‘reason’) to respond to some situation rationally. If, as the 
context makes clear, having sufficient reasons (not ‘reason’) requires the existence of one or 
more such things, I think we should reject (L1).  
Think about a practical case. Agnes has to decide whether to f or not to f. Couldn’t 
Agnes find herself in a situation in which she is certain that there is neither a good reason to f 
nor a good reason not to f? In such a situation, it seems it wouldn’t be irrational for her to f. I 
don’t want to describe the situation as one in which she lacks or fails to have ‘sufficient reason’ 
to f. I think Lord would want to say that if she failed to have sufficient reason or lacked 
sufficient reason to f, it wouldn’t be rational for her to f. That seems plausible, but it also seems 
plausible that in a case like this it could be rational for her to f (or for her not to f). In the 
absence of any reason not to f, she can have all the reason she needs (and so have ‘sufficient 
reason’ in some sense) even if she does not have a single reason to f. (If the beer is free, Agnes 
has sufficient money for beer even if she’s broke.12)  
																																																																																																																																																																								
since they see seem to think that their view is an interesting philosophical view that requires 
substantive defence, not a trivial consequence of a decision to use the word ‘evidence’ for 
whatever it is that serves as an input to processes that might produce knowledge as output.   
9 Kiesewetter (2017: 180) offers a similar argument the view that we need evidence for 
justification but uses talk of ‘sufficient reason’ instead of defeat.  
10 I don’t mean to deny that various authors (e.g., Conee and Feldman (2004) or McCain (2014)) 
have defended views that have this implication. They’ve also worked through a variety of cases 
to try to show that the evidentialist story provides the best treatment of these cases. I simply 
mean to say that it’s rare to find a direct argument for the claim that all justification derives from 
evidential support or the support of supporting reasons.     
11 For arguments for this view, see Adler (2002) and Shah (2003). 
12 Thanks to Michael Bench-Capon for the example.  
 5 
 The point that I want to stress is that someone who accepts Raz’s picture of the 
normativity of reasons can and should say that Agnes has sufficient reason (not 
‘reasons’)/justification to f without having a good reason to f provided that she doesn’t have 
good reasons not to. We need to say something that covers the case in which there are no 
reasons that that recommend f-ing or recommend an alternative and it should be compatible 
with the idea that an agent who finds themselves in such an uninteresting situation has at least 
one rationally permissible option available to them. It’s consistent with this picture that we 
always have sufficient reason (not ‘reasons’) or justification to f whenever it’s the case that there 
is not one single reason not to f. Agnes might have sufficient reason to skip or turn a cartwheel 
iff (and because) there is not one single reason for her not to. Couldn’t something similar hold 
for belief? Couldn’t there be cases in which someone has sufficient reason or justification to 
believe by virtue of the fact that there is no reason for them not to believe? The fact that reasons 
and only reasons are normative doesn’t close off this possibility. If something closes off this 
possibility, it’s something else that closes off this possibility. It would be something that goes 
beyond what the argument above gives us.    
 Someone might say there’s an important difference between the practical cases and 
beliefs. They’ll say that there’s a general presumption in favour of the view that when it comes to 
belief we cannot have justification without supporting reasons (count noun) since it’s clear that 
for some beliefs (e.g., inferentially justified beliefs) we do have decisive reason not to believe 
when we don’t have sufficient evidence.13 In the inferential case, having no evidence ensures that 
we don’t have sufficient evidence and ensures that it would be irrational to believe. If I want to 
carve out a special exception for perceptual belief, shouldn’t it fall to me to explain why some 
beliefs don’t need evidence for their justification? 
I accept the responsibility. Consider my counterargument:  
(KN1) If you were to believe p and therein come to know 
that p, you would violate no epistemic norms. 
(KN2) You can believe p and therein come to know that p 
without having any independently possessed evidence that 
supports this belief.14  
(KN3) So, you can believe p without having any 
independently possessed evidence that supports this belief 
without violating any epistemic norms. 
(KN4) If you believe p without violating any epistemic norms, 
you have sufficient reason (not ‘reasons’) to believe that p. 
(KNC) So, you can have sufficient reason (i.e., justification) 
to believe p without evidence. 
The above challenge assumed (and I granted) that inferential beliefs need supporting evidence, 
but then tried to show that this supports a more sweeping view according to which all beliefs 
																																																						
13 This seems to capture part of Lord’s (2013) motivation for accepting (L1). Justin Snedegar (in 
conversation) also suggested that there was a presumptive case in favour of (L1).  
14 Since Williamson’s (2000) identification of evidence and knowledge is in the space of possible 
views we should consider, I should make it clear that when I speak of knowledge without 
evidence, I mean this kind of case. Agnes is in a position to know, say, that she’s sitting on the 
rug even though she presently has no evidence for this belief. In coming to know, E=K tells us 
that a consequence of coming to know this is that she has entailing evidence for this belief (i.e., by 
coming to know that she’s sitting on the rug, her evidence entails that she is), but it warns us 
against thinking that a precondition on coming to know is that Agnes possessed evidence for her 
belief prior to forming this belief. In the relevant sense, the case just described is a case of 
knowledge without evidence because the only evidence that supported Agnes’s belief that she’s 
sitting on the rug is acquired because she’s formed that belief.   
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need supporting evidence for their justification. To this, I respond as follows. We determine 
whether beliefs have or lack justification by thinking about how they relate to norms or 
normative standards. One such standard, of course, is the knowledge norm. We might say that 
certain violations of it count as unjustified and that certain beliefs that conform to it count as 
justified. When a proposition is clearly something we couldn’t know ‘straight off’ but could only 
know by relating it to other things that we know or justifiably believe, it’s clear that evidence is 
needed for justification because it’s needed to ensure that the belief has some of the properties 
needed for knowledge (e.g., that it isn’t one that would be true just as a matter of luck). Since it’s 
obvious that I cannot tell straight off whether infection rates have decreased over the past 
month, if I were to believe that they were without evidence then this belief would be one that 
would be accidentally true if true and would not be something that I knew. It’s this obvious 
failure to conform to the knowledge norm that explains why supporting evidence is needed for 
its justification. It’s because of how I’m related to the relevant facts that I’d need evidence to 
have knowledge and so need evidence to have justification. When, however, we’re dealing with 
something that I can tell straight off (e.g., whether my legs are crossed, whether I’m thinking 
about Vienna, whether the pain is in my toe or in my elbow), it isn’t at all clear why I would need 
supporting evidence for beliefs about such things to be non-accidentally true if true.15 It’s not 
clear why they’d need evidence to be knowledge. And it’s not at all clear why we should say that 
a belief that constitutes knowledge but isn’t supported by evidence would fail to be justified. 
Knowing means you don’t have to stop believing. Presumably, we’re supposed to stop believing 
when we lack justification. Without some argument against the possibility of immediate 
knowledge that isn’t accounted for in terms of independently possessed evidence, I think it’s 
clear that the presumptive case for thinking that need evidential reasons for the justification of 
every belief isn’t dispositive.      
     
3. McDowell on knowledge 
I don’t think the argument discussed above settles the question as to whether we need perceptual 
evidence for justification. Even if some beliefs cannot be justifiably held unless supported by 
sufficient evidence, there might be some things that we can know ‘straight off’ without relying 
on any evidence at all. If such immediate knowledge without evidence is possible, justification 
without evidence should also be possible. And if that’s possible, we might reasonably wonder 
why we should think that perceptual evidence is necessary for perceptual justification or 
knowledge. Knowing ensures that we have all the justification we could need.  
 I want to turn to one of McDowell’s arguments now because he’s given the only extant 
argument that I know of for thinking that the kind of knowledge that I conjectured might be 
possible is in fact impossible. His argument is supposed to show that all knowledge requires 
evidence. If sound, his argument undercuts my objection to Lord’s argument.   
 McDowell writes: 
In the hybrid conception, a satisfactory standing in the space 
of reasons is only part of what knowledge is; truth is an extra 
requirement. So two subjects can be alike in respect of their 
satisfactoriness of their standing in the space of reasons, 
because only in her case is what she takes to be actually so. 
But if its being so is external to her operations in the space of 
																																																						
15 I think that Anscombe (1962) makes a compelling case that knowledge of the position of our 
own limbs without evidence is possible and that McGinn (2012) and Millar (2019) make a very 
powerful case for thinking that perceptual knowledge without evidence is possible. I would add 
that some cases of self-knowledge seem to be clear cases of knowledge without evidence. Conee 
and Feldman (2004) might disagree on the grounds that evidence as they understand it is present 
in some of these cases.     
 7 
reasons, how can it not be outside the reach of her rational 
powers? And if it is outside the reach of her rational powers, 
how can its being so be the crucial element in the intelligible 
conception of her knowing that it is so (1998: 403)? 
Those who defend a hybrid conception of knowledge (a conception that McDowell rejects) will 
say that reasons for belief bring us only part of the way towards knowledge. The truth of the 
relevant belief is a further factor that must obtain and a factor that might fail to obtain even 
when we have reasons that provide justification (i.e., ensure a ‘satisfactory standing in the space 
of reasons’). The problem with this idea of knowledge is the idea of attaining a kind of positive 
normative standing because of the support of reasons and because some additional factor (i.e., 
grace, good fortune, invisible interventions by unknown guardian angels). The additional factor, 
which has nothing to do with our reasons or the operation of reason, McDowell thinks, cannot 
be an essential factor in making it that we manage to respond to the world as experienced as we 
ought to. It must be within the reach of reason and down to what reasons we have that we have 
managed to respond to the world as experienced as we ought to, but then we cannot come to 
believe what we ought to without any reasons at all for reason to operate on. So, on the 
assumption that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons in the sense that the difference 
between knowing and believing without knowing corresponds to the difference between 
believing what we ought to and failing to believe what we ought to, knowledge without evidence 
isn’t possible.     
 One worry I have with the argument is that I don’t see why we should grant that 
normative standings depend exclusively upon reasons within the reach of our rational powers.16 
In some sense, the reasons in virtue of which the ancient baddies should have done things 
differently might have been outside the reach of their rational powers, but they were the baddies 
and they shouldn’t have acted and believed as they did.17 Even if we bracket these concerns, 
problems remain.         
 
3.1 Defeasibility and defeasible reasons 
																																																						
16 Could McDowell abandon this idea that knowledge is normative and just focus on 
justification? Wouldn’t his argument show that justification depends upon possessing reasons 
that provide certain support for our beliefs? I don’t think so. It would then seem that the 
premise (i.e., justification depends upon having reasons that ensure that we’re justified) would 
either be too close to the conclusion to support (L1) or would suffer from the same dialectical 
problem. Grant that we could have knowledge without evidence, and I think we have to concede 
that we don’t have any good reason to accept (L1).  
17 In Littlejohn (2012, 2014), I argue that certain ‘morally loaded’ cases can be used to attack 
various internalist views of the justification of belief with a special focus on cases of normative 
uncertainty and mistaken normative belief. Srinivasan (forthcoming) defends a similar kind of 
‘radical externalism’ and our externalist view is difficult to reconcile with this claim that a 
normative standing is determined entirely by things that are within reach of a particular person’s 
rational powers. If some consideration is not within someone’s reach because they are cruel or 
selfish, say, the reason might still apply to them, determine what they ought to do, and the failure 
to reach seems to explain why they’re culpable for the failure rather than shift or subvert their 
obligation. It should be said that it’s not clear whether McDowell’s point about reasons and the 
reach of our rational capacities is intended as a general point about normative status or just as a 
point about what’s needed for knowledge (e.g., a point about the kind of non-accidental 
connection needed for knowledge).   
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McDowell’s rejection of the hybrid view commits him to the view that what we’re in a position 
to know supervenes upon what we’re aware of and our awareness of it.18 We might be sceptical 
that there exist such objects of visual awareness or episodes of visual awareness that have this 
epistemic upshot.19 We might be even more sceptical that we satisfy this condition in the case of 
inductive inference.  Knowledge via inductive inference is based on awareness of reasons such 
that it’s metaphysically possible for some thinker to be aware of just these reasons and to fail to 
know. The defeasibility of this knowledge is partially down to the fact that the grounds for it are 
defeasible. Once we allow for knowledge from defeasible grounds, we’re committed to the 
hybrid conception of knowledge. 
 
3.2 We do not see (or watch, look at, or view) what we know 
Suppose that what perception relates us to is wholly particular. What perception places in view is 
limited to things that are in the perceiver’s surroundings (Travis 2013). Could facts about what 
																																																						
18 If this were insufficient, we would locate something necessary for knowledge outside of the 
reach of our rational powers and that saddles us with the hybrid conception of knowledge.   
19 If we thought that that Agnes’s eyes are blue was among the things that were there in the 
surroundings for us to view, look at, watch, or see, we might be tempted by the view that what 
the senses come into contact with might (e.g., by virtue of making us consciously aware of them) 
ensure that the beliefs we form by taking in what the senses come into contact with couldn’t 
possibly fail to constitute knowledge. For how could one be both aware that p and fail to be in a 
position to know that p? Good question. Part of my answer is that being aware that p just is 
knowing that p. (See French (2012) for a discussion of ‘sees that p’.) Part of my answer is that the 
thought that that Agnes’s eyes are blue is something in our surroundings that might come into view 
is deeply confused. (See Longworth (2018) and Travis (2013).) If we acknowledge that what our 
senses encounter is limited to what is located in our surroundings (and thus particular, not 
general in the way that that Agnes’s eyes are blue must be), we have to acknowledge that that Agnes’s 
eyes are blue is only something we could be made aware of by means of (a) some form of visual 
contact with Agnes and her eyes and (b) the exercise of conceptual capacities (which assimilate 
the present case to a range of other cases of having blue eyes which we aren't visually aware of), we 
see that there must be some story about how the concept’s application to the present case is 
triggered by something particular that the senses encounter that merits this application and 
ensures that the application isn’t just accidentally correct. This story will describe a process that 
doesn’t begin with propositional inputs because the point of this story is to tell us why the first set 
of concepts are applied to the particulars that come into contact with our senses. Once we see 
that this part of the overall story about how we form perceptual beliefs and acquire perceptual 
knowledge does all the work of explaining how the concepts are applied in such a way that the 
correctness of their application is non-accidental, we can see one reason to doubt the need to 
posit non-doxastic propositional attitudes that support our perceptual beliefs to explain how 
these beliefs (e.g., about Agnes’s eyes being blue) could be non-accidentally correct. Once we 
have a story that explains how in coming into contact only with particulars our concepts might 
be correctly and non-accidentally applied in experience, we can cut out the middle man and tell a 
story about how a process that produces perceptual belief without any antecedent non-doxastic 
propositional attitudes might produce beliefs that are non-accidentally correct. The success of an 
argument, then, that seeks to show that perceptual knowledge is only possible in creatures whose 
perceptual beliefs are based on further propositional attitudes would turn on identifying some 
further condition on knowledge (i.e., one distinct from the non-accidentality condition) that 
wouldn't be met. It is unclear what condition this might be. Once we have belief, truth, and a 
non-accidental connection that's grounded in the operation of our perceptual capacities, we seem 
to be pretty close to knowledge. For further discussion, see Littlejohn (2017). 
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we’re in a position to know perceptually supervene upon facts about perceptual contact with 
particulars? I doubt it.  
Think about the fake barn cases (Goldman 1976). In the good case, Agnes sees a barn 
and come to know that the building is a barn. Consider a case as similar to this one as possible in 
which there are nearby fakes that she doesn’t see but still prevent her from knowing. Agnes 
couldn’t know that the building she sees is a barn even though it is one. My claim is this. Facts 
about whether she perceives something and what she perceives are the same in the two cases. 
The modal difference between the cases (i.e., the fact that she could have easily seen a ringer in 
one case but there are no fakes in the other) matters to what she can know but not to what she 
can see (or watch, look at, view). Facts about what we are in a position to know perceptually do 
not supervene upon facts about the objects of perceptual awareness and our awareness of them.20  
 One lesson that I’d take from the fake barn case concerns the objects of knowledge and 
perception. If the object of perceptual awareness was just what we know, it’s easy to see why 
someone might think that seeing guarantees that we’re in a position to know. Once we abandon 
this view, however, and think that what we see is limited to particulars that aren’t the objects of 
knowledge, we might reasonably worry that what can know depends upon more than just what 
the inputs are to the processes that produce our perceptual beliefs. This is the thin wedge that 
pushes us towards the hybrid view. Once we embrace that view, we cannot rely on McDowell’s 
arguments to show that certain forms of knowledge (i.e., knowledge without evidence) aren’t 
possible.         
 
3.3 The bad case 
The third problem is this. Even if we think that, say, there’s a notion of justification according to 
which a belief is justified only if it is knowledge, we want to say something nice about the bad 
case. Let’s suppose that we reserve justification for a kind of objective suitability that amounts to 
something like knowledge and say that beliefs are rational when they are subjectively or 
prospectively suitable. If we agree that in the bad case you have rational (albeit not justified) 
beliefs, we want some account that explains why this is. If all that the disjunctivists like 
McDowell can say about the evidence in the bad case is that it is not discernibly different to the 
evidence we have in the good, we don’t seem to have any explanation as to why beliefs in some 
bad cases are rational. 
 
4. Schroeder on the defeasibility of perceptual knowledge and justification 
Here’s where things stand. It seems that Lord’s argument doesn’t show that justification always 
requires evidence if it’s possible to have some immediate or non-inferential knowledge without 
evidence. (Such knowledge would seem to show that we can have justification without evidence.) 
McDowell’s argument is supposed to close off the possibility of knowledge without evidence, 
but the implications of this argument don’t sit well with the idea that much of our knowledge is 
defeasible and provided by fallible sources. Let’s start fresh.  
 Schroeder (2015) defends a Kantian view of knowledge. Knowing, he says, is believing 
for sufficient subjective and objective reason. We should consider this view because it, like 
McDowell’s view, vindicates the idea that all knowledge must be supported by reasons. It differs 
from that view, however, in that it seems to explain many of our intuitions about the defeasibility 
of knowledge.  
Let me flag one thing. Schroeder’s approach is similar in some respects to McDowell’s. It 
thus differs from mine which is inspired by Williamson (2000). In the knowledge-first view 
developed below, facts about knowledge aren’t explained in terms of facts about reasons, the 
ways they balance, or their sufficiency.  Facts about knowledge explain facts about reasons. I say 
																																																						
20 One response (and the only response that makes sense to me) would be to insist that we do 
have knowledge in these cases. See Schellenberg (2018: 210) for discussion.  
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that it’s because we know that we have sufficient reason to believe. He says that it’s because we 
have sufficient (subjective and objective) reason to believe that we know. Like McDowell, the 
possibility of and presence of knowledge is explained in terms of reasons. Reasons are, for him, 
more fundamental.21 
While Schroeder and McDowell will both say that beliefs are knowledge because of some 
relations between these beliefs and reasons, Schroeder offers a strikingly different account of 
reasons and (crucially) of their sufficiency. McDowell is committed to a (seemingly) problematic 
kind of infallibilism because he says that reasons for Agnes to believe p are sufficient iff 
necessarily by having these reasons she’s in a position to know p. (Thus, if those reasons are 
compatible with ~p, they couldn’t be sufficient to believe p.) For Schroeder, some reasons will be 
(subjectively and objectively) sufficient for Agnes to believe p iff they are sufficiently weighty. In 
the practical case, a reason might be a good reason to f but fail to make it the case that we may 
or should f because there are weightier reasons to do otherwise. If such a reason were 
unopposed, however, it could make it the case that Agnes ought to f even if that reason were 
quite weak just because there weren’t reasons lined up on the other side to outweigh it. He 
thinks that something similar holds for belief. The factors that determine whether some reasons 
are (subjectively or objectively) sufficient will include the presence/absence of reasons against. 
Reasons that might exist and be sufficient in one case might fail to be in another if they run up 
against reasons on the other side. Understanding sufficiency in terms of balance allows for a kind 
of defeasibility that McDowell’s account cannot. 
 To get a fuller understanding of Schroeder’s account, we need to know more about his 
subjective and objective reasons. We also need to understand how the balance of reasons 
explains the notion of sufficient reason.    
 Let’s start with Schroeder’s subjective and objective reasons. Think of objective reasons 
as facts which we might or might not be cognizant of. And think of them as things that 
determine whether some response (e.g., drinking the drink, believing this is a barn, etc.) is correct. 
If Agnes pours you a Bernie (i.e., a petrol and tonic) and convinces you that it’s a gin and tonic, 
drinking wouldn’t be the correct response. The facts in virtue of which it’s not the correct 
response aren’t known to you now, but they still do their work in determining what the correct 
response would be (i.e., not drinking). We tend to think that in these cases drinking is rational 
even if incorrect. Schroeder says that this is because you had sufficient subjective reason to 
drink. In this case, the subjective reason would be the content of a mental state (e.g., the content 
of your false belief that the stuff is gin). Subjective reasons can be true but they needn’t be. Their 
truth or falsity doesn’t typically have much direct bearing on whether a response is rational.   
We can draw similar distinctions when thinking about reasons for belief. It was rational 
to drink and rational to believe the stuff was gin. This is because there was sufficient subjective 
reason to act or believe. It was incorrect to drink and incorrect to believe the stuff was gin. This 
is because there was not sufficient objective reason to act and believe. In each case, sufficiency is 
																																																						
21 I should add that I’m also slightly sceptical of the project of characterising knowledge by 
appeal to normative reasons since I don’t know if such reasons apply to all the non-human 
animals that we would want to attribute knowledge to. One reason that I’m attracted to Hyman’s 
(2015) approach to knowledge is precisely that it links up the possession of knowledge to the 
abilities that we seem to assume non-human animals have when we think it’s credible to ascribe 
knowledge to them. For some such animals (e.g., Agnes (i.e., my dog)), I don’t think it’s plausible 
that normative reasons apply to her. On my view, knowledge is a non-normative relation that 
can help to explain why some creatures that can be held accountable have/lack justification 
much in the way that utilitarians will say that maximising choiceworthiness is a non-deontic 
property that can help explain why some creatures (e.g., us, but not cows) can act rightly or fail 
to. Someone who is very Kantian might say that this is silly and that only humans are knowers 
because only we have the right rational capacities.   
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supposed to be a matter of the balance of reasons for and against. Reasons (objective or 
subjective) to believe the stuff was gin would be provided by evidence (objective or subjective). 
These can come up against reasons to believe something incompatible (e.g., that the stuff was 
vodka, petrol, distilled water) or to suspend. Reasons to suspend can come from things like 
higher-order evidence (e.g., considerations that indicate that our rational capacities have been 
compromised in some way) or might have to do with non-epistemic factors that help to dictate 
how much evidence would be needed to settle a question (e.g., we might need more evidence to 
rightly decide that someone is guilty if we know that the finding of guilt will mean the death 
penalty than we would if we were trying to get the right answer in a pub quiz). The important 
thing to remember is that the balance of subjective and objective reasons determines whether 
something is rational and correct and it is by believing for reasons that are subjectively and 
objectively sufficient that we come to know.     
In the epistemic case, Schroeder proposes that there’s an interesting connection between 
the sufficiency of subjective and of objective reasons. Objective defeaters can prevent objective 
reasons from being sufficient. In a good case, the marks of a gin and tonic might help us explain 
why you believed for sufficient objective reason. If we add in certain epistemically bad objective 
factors (e.g., the fact that a belief is false, the fact that there are convincing fakes nearby, etc.), 
however, you might fail to believe for sufficient objective reason. These objective defeaters are 
knowledge defeaters and we can think of them as a feature of a case that makes it turn out that 
someone who we might have presumed knew something doesn’t in fact know (2015: 228).  
Objective defeaters come paired with subjective defeaters. Schroeder observes that, “it is 
an important and general fact that objective and subjective defeaters for knowledge always come 
paired” (2015: 229). As he puts it, “the same motivating reasons for belief that could fail to be 
subjectively sufficient because of some further belief could fail to be objectively sufficient 
because of a corresponding further fact” (2015: 242). He exploits this fact to explain why various 
factors (e.g., practical stakes, countervailing evidence) might preclude knowledge and why 
attitudes concerning such factors might defeat rationality (and thereby defeat knowledge). In 
some cases (e.g., the fake barn case discussed below), the explanation of liability to defeat fixes 
on certain facts about subjective reasons and their connection to objective reasons. Because of 
this, the requirement that justified beliefs be based on evidence isn’t an explanatorily idle feature 
of Schroeder’s account.    
We need to add one more piece to the picture. When are reasons sufficient? Here are 
two answers that Schroeder doesn’t accept. The first is my answer: you lack sufficient objective 
reason if (and because) you’re not in a position to know and there is sufficient objective reason if 
(and because) you are in a position to know. The second is McDowell’s answer: the sufficiency 
of reasons turns on whether awareness of them guarantees that you’re in a position to know. 
Schroeder’s account of sufficiency differs from mine because it shares the same explanatory 
ambition of McDowell’s account (i.e., to explain why we are or are not in a position to know in 
terms of relations to reasons) and differs from McDowell’s in that he doesn’t think that the 
metaphysical possibility that someone might believe for the same reasons as you and fail to know 
means that your reasons aren’t sufficient. On Schroeder’s view, reasons are sufficient because of 
how they balance. Balance is understood in terms of their weights.   
Whether the reasons (objective or subjective) are sufficiently weighty depends upon what 
they’re up against. Some reasons might be sufficiently weighty in one case (e.g., because they lack 
competitors) and they might be insufficiently weighty in another (e.g., because of other reasons, 
defeaters, etc.). This gives us the tools that we need to characterise the objective defeat of 
knowledge and the subjective defeat of rationality (which, in turn, is just another way to defeat 
knowledge). Schroeder thinks that the subjective reasons that support belief are pieces of 
evidence. The objective reasons that count against believing needn’t be. The practical stakes, for 
example, might, if unknown, prevent some reasons from being objectively sufficient and beliefs 
about these practical stakes might, if they obtained, prevent some reasons from being 
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subjectively sufficient. Maybe Schroeder wouldn’t put it this way, but I will. You might think that 
if evidence is needed for justification, rationality, or knowledge and we don’t have enough of it, 
this means that there is a reason not to believe. This further reason is not a further piece of 
evidence.22 Don’t assume that the comparative weight of reasons is understood in terms of the 
strength of evidence for and against. It’s not that simple.  
Let’s work through one of his examples. It looks to Agnes that the tile is red. In the 
objective defeat condition, she’s wearing tinted lenses that affects the colour of tiles. In the 
subjective defeat condition, she rationally believes she’s wearing the lenses. Schroeder offers 
these remarks:  
The fact that you are wearing rose-coloured glasses defeats 
your visual evidence that there is something red in front of 
you, on this view, because it cannot be true that you see that 
there is something red in front of you if you are wearing rose-
coloured glasses. This suffices to defeat your knowledge, 
because knowledge cannot be based on false lemmas 
(forthcoming). 
When you are told that you are wearing these glasses, that knocks out the support provided by 
the subjective reason (i.e., that you see that there is something red) and so defeats rationality (and 
knowledge) by ensuring that you lack sufficient subjective reason.  
If I understand his view correctly, Schroeder doesn’t assume that there’s some single, 
overarching objective standard that determines whether there is sufficient subjective and 
objective reason to believe. The real explanatory work is meant to be done by facts about the 
weights of the relevant sets of subjective and objective reasons (e.g., with no reason to suspect 
things are amiss, a certain experience can provide sufficiently weighty reasons to believe that 
would be sufficient in the absence of reasons against believing; with some reason to believe that 
it won’t rain, we might have sufficient reason to believe that it will if the evidence that it will is 
sufficiently strong). This is important to remember when we’re thinking about the explanatory 
virtues of his view compared to the alternative introduced below. On the one hand, it might 
seem that plonking down a uniform standard (e.g., the truth norm, the knowledge norm) without 
much explanation as to why there is such a standard detracts from the explanatory power of a 
view (e.g., my view).23 On the other, it might seem that if we don’t have much insight into why 
certain reasons have the weights that they do or why certain things will or will not constitute 
reasons that weigh in favour or against, this detracts from the explanatory power of Schroeder’s 
approach.  
I’d like to say four things about the approach to the defeasibility of knowledge and 
rationality. First, we can see why Schroeder thinks that the case isn’t a case of believing 
																																																						
22 See Owens (2000). Schroeder (2015) agrees and it’s an important part of his understanding of 
the balance of reasons. Part of my response to McDowell’s (1998) argument against 
disjunctivism is that there might be objective reasons not to believe in the bad case and no 
objective reason not to believe in the good case. This gives us a difference in reasons that 
explains the difference in knowledge and this lets us say that whilst being in the good case means 
that there’s a difference in reasons, the difference isn’t explained in terms of awareness of 
reasons that guarantee that we’re in the good case. In this respect, my views are more similar to 
Schroeder’s than McDowell’s.   
23 In Littlejohn (2017), I try to explain why there should be a uniform standard for belief and 
why it should be knowledge in terms of two ideas. The first is that the standard tells us when a 
belief can fulfil its functional role (which I take to be providing propositionally specified reasons 
for use to use in reasoning). The second is an account of which beliefs are fit to fulfil their 
function. I think that beliefs are fit for this function iff they constitute knowledge and this is why 
knowledge is the norm of belief.  
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something for sufficient objective reason (i.e., because the subjective reason that constitutes the 
subject’s reason is false). This approach isn’t (and isn’t meant to be) one we can generalise across 
all cases. It doesn’t cover the case of knowledge from defeasible grounds. Moreover, it’s not 
clear that it delivers the right verdict in all cases. If Schroeder’s view says that when we infer 
something from a false belief we don’t believe for sufficient objective reason, his account says 
that we always lack knowledge in such cases. Against this, I think there are counterexamples to 
counter-closure in which we reason from false beliefs and thereby acquire knowledge (e.g., Tiny 
Tim believes (and knows) there will be presents under the tree because he believes Father 
Christmas will deliver them).24 Because of this, I have some worries about the explanatory power 
of his approach. In some cases, it seems to matter to whether we know whether Schroeder’s 
subjective reasons are true. In some cases, it doesn’t.      
Second, while Schroeder might be right that the thing he’ll describe as the insufficiency 
of subjective reason sometimes helps explain why we don’t know, I don’t know that it does in 
every case. Let me foreshadow something I’ll say below. Think about cases of improbable 
knowing (e.g., Williamson’s (2014) unmarked clock). If these cases are genuine, we have a case in 
which a subject can know even though the probability that they don’t know is very close to 1. 
The case poses a problem for the Kantian view and its approach to defeat. Let ‘p’ be the thing 
that is, according to Williamson, the strongest thing Agnes can know when she views the 
unmarked clock so that, on Williamson’s description, we say Agnes knows p but the probability 
on her total evidence that she knows p is close to 0. Consider three theoretical options:  
1. Agnes knows p but it’s not reasonable for her to believe p;  
2. Agnes knows p and it’s reasonable for her to believe p; 
3. It’s not reasonable for Agnes to believe p and she doesn’t know p. 
My preferred option is (1), but here’s the problem for the Kantian view. On the one hand, if we 
say that Agnes knows p, Schroeder’s view says that she believes for sufficient subjective reason. 
And if we say that it’s not reasonable for her to believe p, it’s tempting to say that she doesn’t 
believe for subjective reason. If we opt for (1), we either sever the connection between what’s 
reasonable to believe and what we have sufficient subjective reason to believe (which seems 
costly) or we sever the connection between what we can know and what we have sufficient 
subjective reason to believe (which turns this into a counterexample to the Kantian view).25 If we 
opt for (2), we avoid this, but we have to swallow this bitter pill. We have to say that running 
incredibly high risks of believing without sufficient objective reason is compatible with believing 
for sufficient subjective reason.26 I don’t think our best account of the connection between the 
																																																						
24 See Hilpinen (1988) and Luzzi (2010) for discussion of counter-closure (i.e., the idea that if we 
come to know (or justifiably believe) something inferentially, the supporting beliefs themselves 
must also have been knowledge (or justified)).  
25 For a defence of unreasonable knowledge, see Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). These cases make me 
worry also about Bird (2007) and Ichikawa’s (2017) approach to justification. While I think 
there’s a notion of justification that patterns with what we objectively ought to believe on which 
justified beliefs just are pieces of knowledge, they want an account of justification which is closer 
to my notion of rationality. It’s supposed to tell us (roughly) what we subjectively ought to 
believe and capture that thing that BIVs can have when they believe they have hands. Bird and 
Ichikawa say that on their view a belief is justified even if it’s not knowledge provided that a 
subject sufficiently like the believer has knowledge. My worry is that if we’re trying to 
characterise this more subjective notion, it shouldn’t be something that we can have when we 
know when it’s also nearly certain on our evidence that we don’t know. In my view, these 
accounts don’t factor in risks of objective wrongfulness in the right way.      
26 Someone might ask why this possibility is any more problematic than the possibility that we 
believe a truth in spite of running incredibly high risks of believing a falsehood. If we generally 
allow that an arbitrarily high risk of failure is compatible with success, why don’t we allow for it 
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objective and subjective ought will let us take this view towards running known risks of believing 
or acting against (overall) objective reason. We shouldn’t say, for example, that we need to be 
certain that we lack sufficient objective reason to respond in some way for it to be the case that 
we subjectively should not respond in that way. The problem with the third response, 
Williamson would argue, is that it leads to a form of scepticism.  
Third, consider the treatment of environmental luck cases. Here’s how Schroeder tackles 
this case:  
If Jones sees something that looks like a barn in broad 
daylight, under ordinary circumstances we would take that to 
be an excellent objective reason to believe that it is a barn. 
But if he is in fake barn country, visual evidence of a barn is 
not such a great reason to believe he is seeing a barn after all 
(2015: 247). 
What standard of goodness of reason is at play? If the goodness of reason were cashed out in 
truth-centric terms (e.g., reliability, probability), it’s hard to see why the reasons couldn’t be 
sufficiently good if the number of fakes were sufficiently small.27 Even if the number were small, 
they still might threaten knowledge. 
I have similar concerns about lottery cases. Suppose we don’t have knowledge in such 
cases. On the Kantian view, this means we cannot believe for sufficient subjective and objective 
reason. Why couldn’t we? I think it’s hard to say why we cannot believe for sufficient subjective 
or objective reason in lottery cases without appeal to a standard like the knowledge norm to 
explain why there’s decisive reason not to believe in such a case. If you asked me to explain why, 
say, we couldn’t believe for sufficient subjective and objective reason in the lottery case and you 
told me that I couldn’t help myself to the general norm that enjoins us not to believe things we 
wouldn’t know, I’d struggle. I could say that you shouldn’t believe such things because you know 
that there’s some small chance that you’ll be mistaken, that a policy that allowed such beliefs 
would permit us to believe inconsistent sets of propositions, or that this would allow us to 
believe things that won’t be part of the best explanation as to why we have the evidence that we 
do. Would this move you? I don’t think it should. In each case, there seem to be cases of 
knowledge in which these conditions aren’t met. I suspect that at bottom the real reason we 
think that we shouldn’t believe lottery propositions is that they are, in Sutton’s (2007) 
terminology, known unknowns. This explains why we think we have decisive reason not to 
believe.28  
																																																																																																																																																																								
here? One answer is this. It seems that an important input into the theory of what a subject 
subjectively ought to do are clear intuitions about the rational management of certain risks. In 
this case, the risks might be that of failing to believe what she can know and believing something 
without knowing. If we say that someone subjectively ought to believe in spite of the enormous 
risk of believing without knowing, we seem to have overlooked the importance of handling the 
risk of believing without knowing. If we say that someone subjectively ought not believe in spite 
of there being nearly no risk at all of believing without knowing, we seem to have overlooked the 
importance of handling the risk associated with the wrongful omission.       
27 For a debate about whether the Kantian account handles environmental luck cases, see de 
Prado Salas (2016) and Whiting (2015). See also Schroeder’s (2015b) reply.  
28 Of course, as Earl Conee has reminded me, some will say that we should believe lottery 
propositions. See McGlynn (2013), for example. This option isn’t available to Schroeder if such 
propositions are things we know we cannot know. If we cannot know such things, we cannot 
believe them for sufficient subjective and objective reason. If we know that we cannot know 
them, we know we cannot believe them for such reasons. If it’s possible to rationally believe 
such propositions even though we know we cannot know them, this would be a straightforward 
counterexample to Schroeder’s Kantian view. For what it’s worth, I think that it’s clear that it’s 
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This is just a suspicion, but let me say something that might help motivate the concern. 
Consider an example:  
Eye Exam. An eye doctor has you look into a device that 
flashes slides. You were asked to identify the number or letter 
that you see. In each case, the letter or number appears quite 
clearly to you. The exercise is a bit tedious as it goes on for 
quite some time without much by way of variability. The 
letters and numbers aren’t particularly small or blurry. Your 
doctor says that you did very well and won’t need glasses 
(Dutant and Littlejohn forthcoming b: 5). 
Your doctor adds that you made one error.  
 Before being told that a mistake was made, each true belief you form could be 
knowledge. After you believe that the mistake was made, you could continue to retain your 
knowledge (and come to know something new—that a mistake was made) provided that you 
remember what you judged in these cases and didn’t abandon your beliefs.29 If I’m right about 
how much you can know, it’s tempting to think that you can also continue to rationally believe. 
 How many beliefs might be rational in this case? It would be dogmatic to say that it’s 
not rational to believe the doctor. It would be too externalist to say that some but not all might 
be rational. It would be too sceptical to say that none would be rational.30 This is a perfectly 
good case of rational inconsistency. You have rational beliefs in spite of the chance of error, in 
spite of the fact that you’d have an inconsistent set of beliefs, and in spite of the fact that it 
couldn’t be the case that each belief is part of the best explanation as to why you have the 
evidence that you do.31  
The things that people have said to explain why lottery beliefs cannot be rationally held 
(without appealing the knowledge norm) are things that suggest that our beliefs in preface cases 
cannot be rationally held (and the things that people tend to say to show that beliefs in the 
preface case are rational suggest that they should be rational in the lottery case). I have serious 
doubts about explaining the crucial sets of intuitions (i.e., that we can mostly believe for 
sufficient subjective and objective reason in preface cases but cannot in lottery cases) without 
																																																																																																																																																																								
not rational to believe lottery propositions outright. Consider Conee and Feldman’s suggestion 
that we only have sufficient evidence when our evidence “places the [truth of a] proposition 
beyond reasonable doubt” (2005: 103). It’s generally agreed in the law and in philosophical 
discussions of the standard of proof that the kind of naked statistical evidence we have in lottery 
cases does not place the truth of the proposition beyond reasonable doubt. See Gardiner (2019), 
Littlejohn (2017), Smith (200), and Moss () for discussion of the insufficiency of naked statistical 
evidence for a criminal conviction and attempts to explain how we can lack sufficient evidence 
to believe lottery propositions when we have it to believe things via experience, testimony, 
memory, and so on.        
29 Make the numbers quite large if that helps. Make the grounds quite diverse if that helps and 
make this a geography exam, logic exam, a series of history exams, etc. 
30 For a defence of this view, see Christensen (2004). For a dissenting view, see Ryan (1991, 
1996). 
31 For a defence of this kind of explanationist view, see McCain (2014). This view provides a nice 
explanation as to why we might not be rational in lottery cases, but I think it struggles with 
preface cases. Why can’t each rational belief be part of the best explanation of your total 
evidence? The idea is that the best explanation would be a consistent explanans. If you divide 
your beliefs up into consistent subsets of beliefs, we could have two equally good explanations, 
but if neither is best, we couldn’t explain how the beliefs could be justified and if some 
consistent set were the best, we couldn’t explain how the others could be justified.  
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invoking a knowledge norm to explain why some beliefs but not others are held for sufficient 
reason.32 
Consider one final case. On the Kantian view, if Agnes believes p but doesn’t know p, 
she either fails to believe for sufficient subjective reason or for sufficient objective reason. If 
there’s a case in which she believes and a lack of knowledge isn’t due to one of these failures, we 
have a counterexample. We know little about what kinds of things might prevent objective 
reasons from being sufficient, but here’s a test case. How do we handle cases involving 
conjunctions like, ‘Dogs bark, but I don’t know that they do’? 
Obviously, this cannot be known. The question isn’t whether it can be known, but 
whether we should think that the Kantian view has the resources to handle the case.  We either 
have to say that we cannot believe this for sufficient subjective reason or cannot believe for 
sufficient objective reason. The case can be formulated in the third-person, so that rules out an 
explanation given in terms of subjective reasons.33 Everything turns on whether we have to fail 
to believe for sufficient objective reason. We have almost nothing to go on here to explain why it 
would be impossible to believe for sufficient objective reason except that the thing cannot be 
known (e.g., it can be based on sufficiently good subjective reason, it can be true, etc.). If we 
have to appeal to the fact that it’s not known to explain why it cannot be believed for sufficient 
objective reason, this comes very close to using the lack of knowledge to explain something 
about the ways that the reasons have to be balanced. If we do this, we seem to appealing to the 
knowledge norm to do explanatory work.34 This is precisely what I’d urge everyone to do, but it 
seems that once we invoke this norm, we’re no longer in the game of explaining everything in 
terms of the balance of reasons.  
 
5. Knowledge and Defeat 
There isn’t some single thing that actions ought to aim at apart from ensuring that we do what 
we have most reason to do. It makes sense to think about the objective reasons, their weights, 
and the balance when trying to decide whether someone acted correctly or rationally. When it 
comes to belief, there is some single standard that governs all belief that can tell us whether and 
why we can or cannot have sufficient objective reason to believe something.35 Beliefs, I say, are 
																																																						
32 These preface-type cases are particularly troubling for views that say that rational beliefs are 
rational because they’re based on sufficient subjective reason where these views allow that these 
reasons might be falsehoods. (See, for example, Comesaña and McGrath (2016) account of 
perceptual justification.) It’s one thing to say that we might have rational but inconsistent beliefs, 
but can we allow for inconsistent evidence? If having sufficient subjective reason implies having 
sufficient evidence and having sufficient evidence requires crossing some threshold of support, 
we face the problem that conditional probabilities are undefined when a subject’s total evidence 
is inconsistent (and hence received probability 0). For discussion, see Williamson (2009). Once 
we allow for false evidence, there seems to be no principled restriction we could place on 
evidence to rule out inconsistent evidence.    
33 Agnes is the F but she doesn’t believe that she is. She believes <The F believes p but doesn’t 
know that p>. This belief couldn’t constitute knowledge. The problem couldn’t be that she fails 
to believe for sufficient subjective reason for had someone else been the F this belief could have 
constituted knowledge even if her subjective reasons were the same.   
34 We can explain why we cannot know the Moorean absurdities without invoking a knowledge 
standard, but it doesn’t seem we can explain why this matters to believing for sufficient 
subjective or objective reason without appeal to such a standard.  
35 If I understand Schroeder’s view, the most unified thing we can say about correctness is that 
it’s determined by the balance of reasons. I would appeal to a unified standard of correctness. 
Wedgwood (2017) says that it’s truth. I say it’s knowledge (Littlejohn forthcoming b). Schroeder 
(2015) and I agree that it’s not (just) truth.  
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supposed to be knowledge. When they are, that’s why there is sufficient objective reason to 
believe. When they aren’t, that’s why there’s not sufficient objective reason to believe and there’s 
sufficient objective reason not to believe. This might be where Schroeder and I disagree.36   
 We see this play out in the cases that look like counterexamples to the no false lemmas 
view. In spite of a belief being based on a falsehood, it seems we can sometimes know and so 
should (objectively) believe. This is puzzling from the perspective of the Kantian view, but it 
isn’t puzzling from the perspective of a view that uses knowledge to explain what sufficiency of 
reasons comes to. We see this play out in the lottery and preface cases. The prospect of coming 
to know is good in one case and not the other. This, I say, is why it seems we have sufficient 
reason to believe in one case and decisive reason not to believe in the other.  
 Suppose that belief is governed by norms such as these: 
K-: If we are not in a position to know p, we should not 
believe p. 
K+: If we are in a position to know p, we should believe p. 
These norms tell us when (and why) we have or lack sufficient objective reason.37 They do not 
tell us much about defeat, however, so the challenge is to use this to give an account of defeat 
that has as much explanatory power as the best alternative (i.e., Schroeder’s account) without 
positing perceptual evidence to explain how perceptual beliefs might be rational in some cases 
and have rationality defeated in others.  
 Rationality defeat has to do with the subjective side of normativity. What we would be 
rational to believe pairs with what we subjectively ought to (or may) believe. What’s irrational 
pairs with what we subjectively shouldn’t believe.38 Rationality defeat is a kind of toxicity. 
Rationality defeaters explain why we subjectively shouldn’t believe. To give a theory of defeat, 
we need a theory of what makes belief irrational, which is to give a theory of what we 
subjectively shouldn’t believe.      
We have a key part of that story in front of us.39 When we’re certain that we objectively 
ought to f (or objectively ought not f), we subjectively should f (or shouldn’t f). It’s under 
																																																						
36 For a defence of this point about the difference between belief and action and its connection 
to reasons, evidence, and rational regret, see Littlejohn (2012: 74). 
37 In what follows, I hope to address Ghijsen, Kelp, and Simion’s (2016) concerns about whether 
there could be knowledge norms given our imperfect access to their application conditions.    
38 I prefer to characterise things in terms of objective and subjective ‘ought’, however, and won’t 
explain anything in terms of subjective reasons. Some might think of what we subjectively 
shouldn’t believe as what we think or believe we shouldn’t believe (in some non-subjective 
sense). This fits with a historical understanding of the subjective ‘ought’, but I don’t think that 
it’s a plausible understanding of what the subjective ‘ought’ could be. In many cases of decision 
under uncertainty, we subjectively ought to do things that we’re certain we shouldn’t objectively 
do, after all. My preferred account of the subjective ought is (a) intended as an account of what 
rational believing consists in and (b) doesn’t underwrite the link between the subjective ought 
and beliefs about some other ought because it tells us that what we subjectively ought to do is 
determined by the possible objective factors that determine what we objectively ought to do and 
the probabilities that these factors obtain.  Thanks to Earl Conee for discussion on this point.  
39 The account of defeat sketched here is developed in much greater detail in Dutant and 
Littlejohn (forthcoming). See also Dutant and Fitelson’s (ms.) account of rationality in terms of 
knowledge-centred epistemic utility theory. One really nice thing about our knowledge-centred 
approach is that we identify some single standard that explains why all defeaters defeat and 
provides a much more straightforward account of higher-order defeat (e.g., hypoxia cases) and 
what we call negative self-appraisal defeat (e.g., cases where you have evidence that some 
particular belief isn’t knowledge, isn’t rational to hold, isn’t supported by evidence, etc.). While 
some truth-centric views of rationality predict that it’s rational to believe certain Moorean 
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conditions of uncertainty about whether we objectively ought to believe that it’s hard to know 
whether we subjectively should believe. Here’s my proposal. Under conditions of uncertainty 
about the objective reasons, we subjectively ought to respond in ways that are sensitive to certain 
risks. We ought to minimise expected objective wrongfulness. In the case of belief, if the 
objective standards governing belief are the knowledge norms, this comes to the idea that we 
subjectively ought to believe iff the probability that by believing we’ll come to know is 
sufficiently high. We subjectively ought not believe iff it is not sufficiently high. What are 
defeaters? They are indicators of ignorance. We have partial defeat when something lowers the 
probability of coming to know. We have full defeat when that probability is brought below some 
threshold.  
What we subjectively should believe is a function of two things, the strengths of the 
objective reasons to conform to K+ and K- and the probability that by believing (or not 
believing) we’ll violate these objective norms. The theory of the subjective ought, I claim, gives 
us our theory of defeat. Some defeaters defeat by lowering the probability of a target proposition 
thereby raising the risk that we’ll believe without knowing. Some raise the probability of not 
knowing without having any impact at all on the probability that our beliefs are true. On this 
account, all defeaters share something in common, which is that they are a sign or a warning that 
we’re violating K-. They might function in slightly different ways depending upon what they 
indicate the particular flaw in our epistemic position might be (e.g., evidence that something is 
false, an indication that we’re in an abnormal situation that’s bad for the normal functioning of 
our cognitive processes, an indication that there are easy error possibilities, etc.). 
The general idea is that we state a theory of rational belief and defeat together. To 
rationally believe something, the probability that the belief is knowledge has to be sufficiently 
high. A defeater is just evidence that we’re in the bad case.  How does this handle our cases? In 
some cases, it’s certain that we won’t know (e.g., the lottery case, Moorean absurdities), so it’s 
certain that we subjectively shouldn’t believe.  In some cases, it’s certain that we will know, so 
there’s no defeat to worry about (e.g., the cogito).  
Thinking about the preface case is helpful for thinking about this view. When the set of 
propositions is large enough, we might think of each proposition in that set is quite likely to be 
something we can know if we believe it. Because of this, the account says that in preface cases 
(but not lottery cases) we subjectively ought to believe. (In the case of each proposition, 
believing minimises expected objective wrongfulness.)  Scale matters.40 As the number of known 
errors increases or the size of the set of relevant propositions is decreased, the probability that 
some proposition in that set is one we can know decreases. At some point, the risk of believing 
																																																																																																																																																																								
absurdities and that certain forms of epistemic akrasia are rational (e.g., Dorst’s (forthcoming) or 
Sturgeon’s (2020) Lockean view), the knowledge-centred view handles most of these cases 
without too much fuss.    
40 Another case in which scale matters is in the case of negative self-appraisal. It’s irrational to 
believe p and believe that you don’t know that p. I think it’s also irrational to believe p, believe q, 
and believe that you don’t know both p and q. It’s not irrational, however, to believe this p1, p2, 
…, pn and to believe that at least one of these things isn’t something I know if n is suitably large. 
This is some evidence that whether it’s rational to believe depends upon some threshold of risk, 
though not (just) the risk of error. I think that if you want to develop a view like Schroeder’s, 
you can use the account sketched here to explain why some risks are such that they prevent us 
from having sufficient reason to believe and other risks are such that they don’t. If we don’t 
introduce probabilistic discounting of objective reasons into the picture of sufficient subjective 
reason, I don’t see how we can account for the importance of scale. I find scale a helpful way of 
making vivid the points about risk and its relevance to rationality.     
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without knowing is too great and it’s no longer rational to believe.41 Believing doesn’t minimise 
expected objective wrongfulness but suspending does. As with the unmarked clock case, such a 
case presents us with hard choices if we characterise knowledge in terms of believing for 
sufficient subjective and objective reasons. We might think that there might be some case in 
which the number of known errors makes it too risky (i.e., unreasonable) to believe in light of 
the normative pressure to conform to K- and K+ even though we might think there is some real 
chance that if we believed something in the relevant set of propositions we could conceivably 
come to know. Perhaps this is another case in which what we objectively ought to believe and 
subjectively ought not believe causes trouble for the Kantian view. 
What about perceptual cases? One way to think about perceptual knowledge without 
evidence is in terms of coming to know things on the basis of how things look. Following Millar 
(2000), I think that what’s key to coming to know, say, that something is a barn by the look of 
the thing is that our disposition to judge is triggered by a distinctive look (i.e., a look that a barn 
has that non-barns you might easily encounter won’t have). On the present proposal, we might 
say that an objective lack of a distinctive look defeats knowledge. (Think of the fake barn case.) 
Similarly, evidence that we’re not keyed in to a distinctive look can function as a rationality 
defeater. (Think of misleading evidence about the presence of nearby ringers.) When it’s certain 
that a look isn’t distinctive, it’s irrational to believe. When it’s certain that a look is distinctive, it 
might be irrational not to. If we cannot be highly confident that a look is distinctive, suspension 
might be rational.  The proposal tells us when it comes to the rationality of full belief, the risks 
to care about and the risk that’s tolerable is determined by the weights of the objective reasons 
to conform to K- and K+. This gives us a general way to think about the ways in which the 
rationality of perceptual belief might be defeated and it gives us a way to think about defeater 
pairing but we didn’t use the notion of perceptual evidence in this account.      
 The proposal sketched here must be the right way to think about defeat if (a) defeat is 
connected to rationality and the subjective ought in the way I’ve just suggested, (b) K- and K+ 
are the objective norms that govern belief, and (c) the subjective ought is characterised in terms 
of minimising expected objective wrongfulness.42 Grant me the assumption that a full rationality 
defeater ensures that we subjectively shouldn’t believe. The only way that this account of 
rationality and defeat could fail to be extensionally adequate is if (a) the relevant objective 
reasons are provided by something other than K- and K+ or (b) the subjective strength of the 
defeater is not proportional to the strength of the objective reasons and the probability that 
																																																						
41 But what is that point? Is there some magic threshold? No. The threshold is determined by the 
strength of the relevant objective reasons. If we can give a cardinal representation of their 
strength, this gives us the threshold. It might be helpful to see Dorst’s (forthcoming) defence of 
the Lockean view and derivation of a non-arbitrary threshold to see how this works in a value-
centric framework and then think about whether we can consequentialise the present framework 
so that we can generate a threshold in the way that he does (i.e., by thinking about the 
undesirability of failing to attain good epistemic results and of bringing about bad epistemic 
results).  
42 For defences of this approach to the subjective ought, see Lazar (forthcoming) and Olsen 
(2018). One nice feature of this approach is that it explains why we sometimes should 
subjectively f even when we know that we objectively should not f and thus this allows for 
rationality and correctness to come apart in the ways that it must to allow for unreasonable 
knowledge and to retain the idea that while we subjectively shouldn’t save all the miners we 
objectively ought to save all the miners. This approach also helps us deal with the problems that 
uncertainty create for theories that try to characterise the deliberative ought in terms of sets of 
objective reasons discussed in Littlejohn (forthcoming).  
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these reasons are actual.43 Our intuitions about lottery cases, preface cases, and various cases in 
which the salient risk of believing without knowing waxes or wanes make me think that this 
account predicts our intuitions quite well. 
 
Conclusion  
I have addressed the three known arguments for thinking that perceptual justification requires 
perceptual evidence. The first sought to show that we need perceptual evidence for perceptual 
justification on the grounds that lacking evidence functions as a kind of defeater. I have argued 
that this is questionable if we don’t have any good reason to deny that knowledge without 
evidence is possible. The only argument I’ve seen that directly aims to establish that this is 
impossible rests on assumptions about knowledge that few of us would defend. Perhaps the 
most promising case to be made for thinking that we need perceptual evidence comes from an 
idea, explored in Schroeder’s work, that positing this evidence helps us understand the 
defeasibility of perceptual justification and knowledge. I offered an account of defeat that I 
believe improves upon his account. If the proposed account is correct and defeaters defeat 
because by giving us evidence that we’re ignorant, my account explains the defeasibility of 
perceptual justification and knowledge without any commitment to perceptual evidence. So, 
while we can all agree that we shouldn’t believe without sufficient reason (not ‘reasons’), I still 
don’t think we have sufficient reason or reasons to believe that we need perceptual evidence for 
perceptual justification.   
Realising that we might not need evidence for justification should free us from the 
burden of trying to find ways in which experience is sufficiently belief-like to shoulder the 
epistemic burden of belief. Maybe only beliefs provide us with propositionally specified reasons 
for believing, feeling, and doing things. Even if normative reasons make the normative world go 
round, we might not need perceptual evidence. Maybe perception can make things evident 
without it.44     
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